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Over the past decade, the Chinese government has embarked on a massive campaign of 
relocation and rehousing targeted at Tibetan nomads, which has resulted in claims of 
human rights violations dealing with forcible evictions, lack of transparency, and 
consultation, as well as with the preservation of indigenous culture, identity, land, and 
knowledge. Attributing the degradation of the grasslands across the Tibetan Plateau to 
overgrazing, the government has framed the forced sedentarization of nomads as a 
prerequisite to ecological and developmental progress. Utilizing the framework of green 
governmentality, this thesis will research the construction of the Communist Party’s 
creation of environmental truths, linking the governing of nature with the governing of 
people as a means of population control. Through the examination of government 
policies and statements, it will document the process of subject forming that relegates 
Tibetan nomads into a population needing to be governed over, while justifying and 
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1. Introduction 
The economic opening of the People’s Republic of China in the 1980s saw the 
country open up to “foreign trade and investment” and to “domestic structural economic 
reform” (Démurger 2000, 9), as well as the introduction of Special Economic Zones, 
which “allowed China to exploit its comparative export advantages and also to acquire 
foreign technology through foreign direct investment” (Démurger 2000, 21). Yet the 
government’s “choice of a “sequential” regional development strategy”, which sought “to 
form growth centres in the eastern part of the country specializing in production of 
relatively technology-intensive goods for export” and sought to “transmit their growth 
dynamic to the inland provinces  [only] in the long term” (Démurger 2000, 14), resulted 
in economic and social imbalances that today still remain to be addressed. With the 
government committed to continued economic development, this has reemerged onto the 
top of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s agenda, as the government seeks to 
counteract the systematic rural-urban inequality and wealth disparity that threatens to 
disrupt the political and social stability (Jeong 2015, 2). Thus in 2000,  “with the aim of 
building infrastructure and telecommunications, improving people’s living conditions, 
and protecting the environment” (Foggin 2008, 26), the government introduced the 
Western Development Strategy in an attempt to promote regional development and bring 
the perceived underdeveloped parts of the country on par with the rest (Wen 2009).  
The government’s pivot to the western regions has cemented the CCP’s push to 
“improve” the environment by exercise power over the control of nature in the form of 
environmental governance and has provided the justification for environmental projects 
through “invoking a scientific logic that interprets the territory as degraded”, resulting in 
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a “broader value coding embedded in state development discourse of the peoples of the 
west as underdeveloped, impoverished and a potential threat to social stability” (Yeh 
2005, 13). Within this development discourse taken up by the state, Tibet has become 
central to the government’s development and economic plans due to importance of the 
region.  Tibet since the Seventeen Point Agreement of 1951 which allowed for the 
Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) to remain in control over its “cultural, economic, and 
even domestic political affairs” (Smith 2004) has been incorporated as a territory within 
China. Contrary to the aims of the Seventeen Point Agreement however, a system rather 
of quasi-autonomy is being practiced that continues to be plagued by political and social 
contestations between the Tibetan population and the Chinese government. This has 
manifested in numerous state sponsored attempts of suppression which target Tibetan 
identity, culture, and religion (Smith 2004) which continue to be denounced on the 
international human rights stage.  
As part of Tibet, the Tibetan Plateau itself, known as “The Water Tower of Asia,” 
supplies 1.3 billion people throughout the continent with access to water and is rich in 
natural resources (Tenzin 2012).  Protection of the natural resources located within the 
region have become pivotal to the Chinese government within the context of a dire and 
increasingly depleted global environment. Looking specifically at Tibetan nomads, who 
account for 25 percent of Tibet’s 6 million population (Hays 2015 and International 
Campaign for Tibet 2016a), the Chinese government has maintained that the degradation 
of the grasslands is largely attributed to overgrazing by Tibetan nomads and has looked to 
the prohibition of grazing to both protect and reverse the damage done to the grasslands 
(Xinhua 2011). Nomads known as drokpa or “high-pasture people” in Tibetan have 
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historically been traced back to as early as the Xia Dynasty (2205 – 1766 BC) and 
maintain a livelihood through migrating “across the Tibetan plateau whilst raising yaks 
and other livestock” (Miller 2008, 118-119). Living either nomadic or semi-nomadic 
livelihoods, nomads herd sheep, yak, cattle, goats, and horses across the Tibetan 
grassland (Hays 2016). Moving approximately two to three times within a year (“Tibetan 
Nomads” 2016), they at times supplement herding with farming to sustain themselves. In 
this way, much of the Tibetan nomadic identity exists around a culture interchangeably 
tied to the land. The inherently migratory lifestyle of nomads has made it difficult for the 
Chinese government to track and govern over the population. In answer to this to this 
problem of governing, the government has continued to construct an identity of the larger 
Tibetan population and Tibetan nomads as underdeveloped, backwards, and unproductive 
in terms of social and economic advancement (Foggin 2008, 27). This has resulted in the 
creation of a discourse geared towards the Foucauldian camp that views the population as 
an impediment to the country’s development aims, thus justifying the necessity of 
governance and increased urbanization. Within this realm of governmentality, through 
maintaining control over the environment, the Chinese government has interchangeably 
sought to maintain control over the nomadic population, resulting in a radical 
transformation of the nomadic identity. 
 
1.1 Green Governmentality in the Chinese Context 
 
The justifiability of the government’s environmental governance agenda has 
however been challenged by human rights activists, scientists, and environmentalists who 
maintain that is it the government’s own “policies that have led to privatization of use 
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rights and household enclosures [that] are more important drivers of degradation” (Cao, 
Yeh, Holden, Qin, and Ren 2013, 81). The official stance of Chinese officials however 
has been to continue to maintain that  
“for development to be achieved in Tibetan nomadic areas, 
nomads must be settled, houses and barns should replace 
the traditional nomad yak hair tent, rangeland must be 
divided into individual family units and fenced, herds need 
to be restructured, livestock numbers should be adjusted to 
carrying capacity, fodder has to be grown for the winter, 
and, for the rangelands, 'ecological engineering' and 
'grassland construction' needs to be undertaken (Miller 
2000, 86).  
 
Such designated “ecological engineering” has taken the form of various government 
programs designated to revitalize the grasslands, through the massive undertaking of 
relocation and rehousing of nomads throughout the country. This has resulted in the 
creation of a discourse surrounding China’s narrative of sedentarization of Tibetan 
nomads and of all nomads for that matter, as a necessity of ecological protection and by 
extension. In particular, these include the 2006 New Socialist Countryside Campaign  
(jianshe xin shehuizhuyi nongcun) which intends to  “ 'let rural farmers upstairs' (rang 
nongmin shanglou) by incorporating them into urban citizenship and township residence” 
(Chuang 2014, 650) through transforming the countryside and reducing the overall rural 
population (Ahlers and Schubert, 2009, 36). This essentially aims to promote rural-urban 
integration through the relocation of rural citizens into townships (Chuang 2014, 650) 
thereby promoting further economic growth within the country. 
Such a desired transformation has been assisted by the Comfortable Housing 
(anju gongcheng) policy and the New Socialist Villages (xinshehuizhuyi nongcun) 
policy, which aim to remodel the existing structure of rural villages upon newly defined 
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government standards that embrace this notion of modernization (HRW 2013, 40-41) and 
“transform rural housing by improving living conditions and providing access to 
transportation, communication, electricity, water, health care, and schooling” (De 
Schutter 2012,15). Additional policies that have also been introduced are the 
environmental migration schemes of “reverting farmland to forest (tuigeng huanlin)” and 
“reverting pasture to grassland (tuimu huancao)”, which promote a shift off the land in 
favor of alternative livelihoods and implemented seasonal, temporary, or total bans on 
grazing”, respectively (HRW 2013, 39-40). Such policies have worked to essentially 
invalidate leaseholds ranging from 30 to 50 years that nomads had been granted since the 
1990s, effectively nullifying nomadic land tenure (Norbu 2012) and shifting governance 
of the land and of the environment out of the hands of nomads into the hands of the 
central government. Although a rather convincing argument exists that the  “experiences 
and intimate knowledge of pastoral nomads should be incorporated into rangeland 
management practices” (Norbu 2012), the exclusion of Tibetan nomads within this 
governance structure highlights the process by which through the exercise of green 
governmentality, “alternative knowledge get submerged, co-opted, and deemed 
illegitimate” (Goldman, 2001, 516-517). This gives rise to a noticeable selectivity where 
the government has only weakly and discriminately chosen to enforce its environmental 
laws (Ma 2007).  The Chinese example effectively highlights how green governmentality 
becomes a concept linked to the improvement of a people or community as defined by 
externally imposed state or institutional standards that calls for a rejection of certain types 
of knowledge which it views as traditional or backwards. This value-based system of 
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environmental governance has been viewed as ineffective, and academics such as Bollier 
and Weston have instead called for the establishment of a  
“governance paradigm based on, first, a logic of respect for 
nature, sufficiency, interdependence, shared responsibility 
and fairness among all human beings; and, second, an ethic 
of integrated global and local citizenship that insists upon 
transparency and accountability in all activities affecting 
the integrity of the environment” (Bollier and Weston 
2016).  
 
Until, however, such a paradigm can be established and effectively implemented 
to include previously excluded citizens, ecological protection in the context of green 
governmentality becomes a major component of the Chinese government’s justifiability 
of its western development aims, particularly with regards to Tibet.  As such, the 
collective implementation of such policies has reduced and eliminated “the migratory 
herd movements between seasonal rangelands, [which represents] a fundamental 
characteristic of traditional nomadic pastoralism” (Miller 2000, 103). The Communist 
Party’s policies represent a forced rejection of the nomadic lifestyle and a desire to 
transform Tibetan nomads into livestock farmers and promote “sedentary livestock 
production systems” (Miller 2000, 103). Through the construction of what can be 
characterized as “environmental truths”, the Chinese government is able to justify its 
regulations and governance over the environment and over the grasslands. It becomes 
then, that “the production of this kind of truth about nature necessitates its regulation, 
management and governing” (Rutherford S. 2007, 295). Thus this perceived need for 
governance gives rise to the notion that “the resources of the earth can be rationalized, 
indexed, measured, assessed and made better through the application of various 
technologies and modalities of rule” (Rutherford 2007, 298). Justifying its imposition of 
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scientific knowledge and solutions, the government places itself in a position where it 
exclusively is equipped to provide the necessary protections to better protect not only the 
environment, but also Tibetan nomadic society. The protective measures that the 
government chooses to implement however, only succeed in completely excluding 
nomadic knowledge and contributions concerning environmental protection.  
 
2. An Introduction to Foucault’s Governmentality  
 
 
Governmentality, the theoretical framework that this research is grounded in refers 
to the concept first introduced by Michel Foucault during his time teaching at the Collège 
de France from 1971 to 1984 (Foucault 2007, 11). In his lectures, Foucault proposed the 
study of governmentality as a solution to tackling “the problem of the state and population” 
(Foucault 2007, 161). It encompasses aspects of control that directly correlate to 
population, and more specifically, to governance over the individual subjects that make up 
said population. Governmentality, as Foucault describes it, provides a means of 
understanding “the type of power that we call government” (Foucault 2007, 161). Within 
the Foucauldian framework, governmentality specifically refers to the 
 “institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, 
calculations, and tactics that allow the exercise of this very 
specific, albeit very complex, power that has the population 
as its target, political economy as its major form of 
knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential 
technical instrument” (Foucault 2007, 144).  
 
Consequently, at the root of Foucault’s lectures stands the notion of population and how 
the state or other institutions will exercise control over the population (Foucault 2007, 
167). Outlining that “population comes to appear above all else as the ultimate end of 
government”, Foucault finds that the purpose of government is to deal with “the welfare 
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of the population, the improvement of its condition, the increase of its wealth” etc. 
(Foucault in Miller, Gordon, Burchell 1991, 100) “and the means that the government 
uses to attain these ends are themselves in some sense immanent to the population” 
(Foucault in Miller, Gordon, Burchell 1991,100). Governance in this manner is 
concerned with the action of controlling a population in order to ensure the security of the 
state, while governmentality deals specifically with the study of the methods and means 
that governments employ to exercise their power. Pivotal to such as a study is the 
existence of what Foucault characterizes as “the politics of truth” (Foucault 2007, 17), 
which finds governmentality to center on the manifestations of truths that give both 
credibility and justification to rule. The construction of such “truths” occur through the 
“development of a series of specific governmental apparatuses” and through “the 
development of a series of knowledges” (Foucault 2007, 161) that result in the desired 
end of managing the population. In the process of bringing about this very end, the state 
directs the actions of individuals to confirm with the expectations that it sets. 
  
2.1 Developments in the Field of Governmentality  
 
Since Foucault’s introduction of governmentality, others have followed suit and 
continued to contribute to the development of the concept. In particular, Miller, Gordon, 
and Burchill in their work The Foucault effect: studies in governmentality: with two 
lectures by and an interview with Michel Foucault (1991) have added to the growing 
literature on governmentality. Linking government and governance to governmentality, 
they define government as “a form of activity aiming to shape, guide or affect the 
conduct of some person or person” (Miller, Gordon, Burchell 1991, 1). With government 
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rooted as such in the intricacies of relations, they hone in on Foucault’s governmentality 
as a means of assessing “relations concerned with the exercise of political sovereignty” 
(Miller, Gordon, Burchell 1991, 2). This interpretation of governmentality focusing on 
“how to govern oneself, how to be governed, how to govern others, by whom the people 
will accept being governed, [and] how to become the best possible governor” (Foucault 
in Miller, Gordon, Burchell 1991, 7) has been encapsulated by Foucault as the question 
of “how to govern”, which he characterizes as the primary concern of governmentality. 
Further contributing to Foucault’s reflections on state constructs, they reiterate Foucault’s 
emphasis on sovereignty being grounded in the very manifestations of truth that the state 
employs (Miller, Gordon, Burchell 1991, 8). Others, such as Mitchell Dean, in his work, 
Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society (2010) outline governmentality as 
“any attempt to shape with some degree of deliberation aspects of our behavior according 
to particular sets of norms and for a variety of ends”  (Dean 2010, 18). This encompasses  
“various forms of thought about the nature of rule and 
knowledge of who and what are to be governed”, “employs 
particular techniques and tactics in achieving its goals, 
allows for the government to establish “definite identities 
for the governed and the governors”, and “involves a more 
or less subtle direction of the conduct of the governed” 
(Dean 2010, 28). 
 
According to Dean, such analysis allows for the creation of a structure with which to 
effectively study governmentality. At the core of such a structure exists the 
manifestations of truth employed by the state that result in the creation of the identities of 
the governors and the governed, in order to effectively manage and direct the population. 
As part of this structure, Dean designates four dimensions necessary to the study of 
governmentality, which he refers to as forms of visibility, techne of government, 
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episteme of government, and forms of identification (Dean 2010).“Characteristic forms of 
visibility [or] ways of seeing and perceiving” (Dean 2010, 3) is characterized by Dean as 
“ways of visualizing fields to be governed” that  
“make it possible to 'picture' who and what is to be 
governed, how relations of authority and obedience are 
constituted in space, how different locales and agents are to 
be connected with one another, what problems are to be 
solved and what objectives are to be sought” 
 (Dean 2010, 41).  
 
Visualized in the forms of charts, data or other forms of representation, they represent the 
“displays needed to sustain regimes” as well as “delimit objects to be governed” (Rogers 
et al. 2016, 431).  The techne of government represent the “mechanism, procedures, 
technologies through which rule is accomplished” (Rogers et al. 2016, 431). Dean asserts 
that  
“If government is to achieve ends, or seeks to realize 
values, it must use technical means. Those technical means 
are a condition of governing and often impose limits over 
what it is possible to do” (Dean 2010, 42).  
 
The third dimension refers to the “forms of knowledge that arise from and inform the 
activity of governing” or rather the episteme of government (Dean 2010, 42). Within the 
third dimension arises the “reason and expertise that [come to] justify and inform the 
techne of governing” (Rogers et al. 2016, 431). The fourth and final dimension, referred 
to as the forms of identification, places emphasis on how identities are formed, looking 
particularly at the “specific practices and programmes of government” that are involved 
in the creation of said identities (Dean 2010, 43). Within this fourth realm lie the 
identities “promoted and presupposed” and imposed by the government or rather 
governing bodies (Dean 2010, 43).  “Used as way to analyze construction of a regime's 
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truth and ways of speaking [or] representing”, forms of identification account for the 
“process by which identities of those who govern and are governed are constructed and 
reified through forms of visibility, administrative practices, and knowledge claims” 
(Rogers et al. 2016, 431). This framework outlined by Dean to study governmentality 
will be employed throughout this paper and will serve as the methodological foundation 
for this research. 
 
2.2 The Transition from Governmentality to Green Governmentality  
 
Although Foucault himself failed to delve deeply into issues concerning the 
environment, the most recent application of governmentality has focused on assessing 
how nature is governed over. Most recently, governmentality has been co-opted in order 
to assess the power relations at play when dealing with how the environment is managed 
and politicized.  This application of governmentality finds its place amidst a pervasive 
discourse of our planet being in peril that has permeated public, political, and academic 
debate globally. Scientist have ventured as far as to mark the beginning of “a new 
geological epoch, [known as] the Anthropocene”, which dictates that  “atmospheric, 
geological, hydrological, biological and other Earth System processes are being altered 
by human activity” (United Nations Environment Programme 2012, XVIII). Framed as 
an unprecedented moment of environmental crisis, humankind appears to be in a race 
against time as we seek to tackle numerous environmental concerns such as rising sea 
levels and global temperatures, increases in greenhouse gas emissions, deforestation, 
destruction of natural habitats, extinction of species, ozone depletion, and climate change 
(United Nations Environment Programme 2012), to name but a few. Confronted with 
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escalating mismanagement, the environment is recongized more and more as a resource 
pool intended to be universally accessible and is viewed as “non-excludable and non-
rivalrous” in that “countries are not rivals when it comes to consuming these goods” 
(Uitto 2016, 108). Human rights are, likewise, increasingly linked to the environment 
with the awareness that human beings “are entitled to a healthy and productive life in 
harmony with nature” (United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
1992, Principle 1) and that the 
“the natural resources of the earth, including the air, water, 
land, flora and fauna and especially representative samples 
of natural ecosystems, must be safeguarded for the benefit 
of present and future generations through careful planning 
or management, as appropriate” (United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development 1972 
Principle 2). 
 
This induces the necessity of collective cooperation that further promotes this notion of a 
shared right to the enjoyment of a healthy and clean environment. Specifically, this refers 
to the  
 “notion of an interconnected world in which all inhabitants 
of the planet have an equal claim on wealth and freedom, 
opening, rather than closing, national boundaries and 
national identities in a recognition of all that joins us, rather 
than separates us as human beings sharing this planet with 
each other and the rest of nature” (King 1997, 2). 
 
Yet the very awareness of the planet’s limited and fragile resources and threat that this 
may pose to a state has conflicted with the notion of the environment as being universally 
accessible. The pressures of this conflict of interest have resulted in a rise in government 
involvement in environmental governance. Environmental governance here refers “to the 
set of regulatory processes, mechanisms and organizations through which political actors 
influence environmental actions and outcomes” (Lemos and Agrawal 2008, 299). 
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Intended to encompass “the actions of the state” as well as additional  “actors such as 
communities, businesses, and NGOs” (Lemos and Agrawal 2008, 299), power and 
control over the environment has largely shifted solely into the state, who views 
environmental crises as a direct threat to its sovereignty. With so much at stake, civil 
society has progressively been excluded from environmental decisions. This comes as a 
result of the state moving to cement itself as the sole authority over decisions made 
regarding nature. This has resulted in the so-called “greening” of national interests and 
national security, where our planet’s resources are being “continually monitored and 
watched over by the new technologies of oversight” (King 1997, 3).  
This very management of “knowledge and political processes in order to regulate 
citizens and make problems governable” (Forsyth and Walker 2014, 408) has evolved 
into the framework now recognized as green governmentality or eco-governmentality.  
Green or eco-govermentality represents a method of management of nature and resources 
that aims to  “classify, colonize, and transnationalize territory in the name of 'eco-
governance' ” (Goldman 2001, 499). It represents an attempt by the State to create a 
discourse surrounding what is regarded as “environmental truth” (Goldman 2001, 501) 
and which assigns culpability to individuals or communities for ecological degradation. 
Governmentality lends itself to the critique of environmental governance as it “deals with 
issues of (state) 'security', techniques of control of the population, and new forms of 
knowledge” (Darier 1999, 22). Eric Darier goes on to outline that  
“according to the framework of governmentality, the 
'security' of the state is guaranteed not so much directly by 
the control of a territory (space), but rather through the 
increasing control of the population living in that territory” 
(Darier 1999, 23).  
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The applicability of governmentality to the environmental sphere becomes present with 
the awareness that “modern thinking about the natural environment is characterized by 
the belief that nature can be managed or governed through the application of the scientific 
principles of ecology” (Rutherford 1999, 37). Timothy Luke goes on to further expand 
upon this, noting that  
“Government comes into its own when it has the welfare of 
a population, the improvement of its condition, the increase 
of its wealth, longevity, health and so on, as its object. And 
ecology gives rational governments all of life's biodiversity 
to reformat as 'endangered populations', needing various 
state ministrations as objects of managerial control ignorant 
of what is being done to them as part and parcel of 'a range 
of absolute new tactics and techniques' ” (Luke 1999, 122).  
 
Governmentality ultimately comes to allow for the justification of “human actions in the 
name of 'nature' ” and also allows for  “the construction of a 'voice' [that] that can 
legitimately speak for nature” (Darier 1999, 23). With the state becoming the prevailing 
spokesperson for the environment, the government exercises its power by controlling 
certain communities and individuals through excluding their voices from the governing 
table. The continued framing of the environment as being in crisis leads to a formulation 
of a certain and uneasily contestable environmental truth, that calls for an assessment not 
only of how knowledge surrounding the environment comes into being, but also into how 
these “truths” are made and governed (Rutherford 2007, 295).  Stephanie Rutherford 
maintains that the construction of the discourse surrounding the environment as being in 
dire need of governance and technological solutions by experts, who become the 
prevailing authority, transforms ecology into a regime of knowledge and power that 
produces a specific and singular notion of truth regarding nature (Rutherford 2007, 298).  
Enabled with such truth telling apparatus, green governmentality can be transformed into 
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a system used by the state to legitimize making local populations “visible and 
accountable” (Yeh 2008, 24) for their perceived environmental transgressions, while 
linking “the governing of nature with the 'improvement' of people” (Yeh 2008, 14). 
Criticism of the model however, have taken issue with its perceived black and 
white formulations of power relations and its failure to account for the complexities of 
multiple sites of governance that occur within the framework of neoliberal governance 
(Rutherford 2007, 292). O’Malley, Weir, and Shearing refer to this as a failure to 
understand “the messy actualities of social relations” (O’Malley, Weir, and Shearing 
1997, 509). As a theoretical framework, green or eco-governmentality, has been faulted 
for its failure to recognize that “governing does not arise as a fully realized project, but is 
debated, revised, fine-tuned and continuously in need of re-articulation” (Rutherford 
2007, 300). Others such as Forsyth and Walker, 
“argue that environmentality should not just be seen in 
terms of the state invoking ‘power over’ citizens, but as the 
active engagement of both state and social actors in 
establishing authoritative knowledge claims simultaneously 
with claims about appropriate social order, which also 
exclude other significant social perspectives and 
environmental management options” (Forsyth and Walker 
2014, 414). 
Their rejection of green governmentality as a functional theoretical framework represents 
a rejection of its perceived assumption that relations between the state and society 
“should only be understood in terms of opposition and resistance” (Forsyth and Walker 
2014).  Green governmentality, in this way, is viewed as missing the mark in providing 
the space to take into account the alliances that form between social actors and the state 
“in the generation and legitimization of knowledge” (Forsyth and Walker 2014), or rather 
of environmental truths. Looking past however the rather state-centric application of 
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green governmentality which fails to account for the proliferation of “nongovernmental 
organizations, corporations, research institutions, the media and other actors” in its 
analysis of power (Rutherford 2007, 303), the concept does still provide a platform to 
assess systems of power relations that are tied to nature and resource management. It 
allows for the study of environmental politics and “to understand and describe how 
modern forms of power and regulation achieve their full effects not by forcing people 
toward state-mandated goals but by turning them into accomplices” (Agrawal 2005, 216-
217). Its introduction of a value system that is assigned to “groups of people and parcels 
of environment” (Goldman 2001, 515) allows for 
“the making of hegemonic forms of rationality that 
translate into effects of government: constructing the 
environmental science and art of targeting populations, 
production practices, and behaviors vis-à-vis nature that are 
judged as guilty or innocent of ecological degradation” 
(Goldman 2001, 516). 
This act of designating the guilty from the innocent represents a form of identity 
construction, which allows for larger analysis surrounding the state’s motivations and 
ultimate end goal.  
 
3. Foucault, Governmentality, and Human Rights  
 
Generally characterized as anti-humanist, earlier in his career Foucault largely 
rejected the universality with which human rights finds its basis. Although perceiving 
human rights to hold some value, he rejected their association “with human nature or the 
essence of the human being in general” (Foucault 2014, 324), holding that the vocation of 
governments is to not respect human rights (Foucault 2014, 324). Foucault went on even 
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to designate human rights as solely the “rights of the governed” (Foucault 2014, 324). 
Yet he does not completely reject the notion of human rights and later on in his career 
seems to have given them further thought. At a press conference in 1981 believed to mark 
the announcement of the formation of the International Committee Against Piracy, 
Foucault noted that 
“because of their claim to care for the wellbeing of 
societies, governments arrogate to themselves the right to 
treat in terms of profit and loss the human suffering which 
their decisions cause and their negligence allows”(Foucault 
1981). 
 
Aware of the predominance of such abuses of power, Foucault spoke of the need for an 
“international citizenship” bound by duties and rights, “obliged to stand up against all 
forms of abuse of power, no matter who commits them, no matter who are their victims” 
(Foucault 1981). He characterizes this as “the right of private individuals to intervene 
actively and materially in the order of international politics and strategy” so as to 
counteract state monopoly over the will of the people (Foucault 1981). Although perhaps 
unintentionally, Foucault comes to promote the existence of rights that are inherent to 
individuals, which are often threatened by the actions of state and other external actors. 
The existence of this looming threat further accentuates the need for human rights amidst 
the systems of governmentality that necessitate oversight, accountability, and protection 
from government infractions.  
 
3.1  Governmentality and Human Rights: A Necessary Relationship  
 
 Scholars in connecting human rights to governmentality have focused largely on 
characterizing human rights as “technologies of government” (Sokhi-Bulley 2016, 9), 
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viewing the language of rights as the “language of governance or governmentally” 
(Sokhi-Bulley 2016, 5). They warn of  “hegemonic state actors  [who] instrumentalise 
human rights as operational tools for exercising power” (Narkunas 2015, 210). Within 
this assessment, human rights take on the role of the dominant discourse and “provide(s) 
a set of norms with reference to which agents may exercise power over other agents, as 
well as over themselves, to ensure conformity” (Manokha 2009, 430). More specifically, 
“rights become a complex, authentic, and self-reinforcing discourse of conducting power 
that creates an empowered and righteous identity for (rights) experts” while working to 
disempower “other subject identities” (Sokhi-Bulley 2016, 12). Such a narrative centers 
on this need for resistance rooted in the “refusal of the form of been conducted” and a 
rejection of the proposed truths of the human rights regime (Sokhi-Bulley 2016, 119). 
Yet, this reiteration of the very viable threat of the state abusing power through systems 
of governmentality seems to only reinforce the importance of human rights in resisting 
and preventing such abuses.  
“Good governance and human rights are mutually 
reinforcing” (United Nations Office of the High 
Commissioner 2017). 
 
Governmentality alone deals with how and whom the state governs and, thus, the 
assessment of governmentality also warrant analysis of the processes through which 
governing materializes. Within this process, human rights “provide a set of values to 
guide the work of governments and other political and social actors” (United Nations 
Office of the High Commissioner 2017). The UN outlines that “transparent, responsible, 
accountable and participatory government, responsive to the needs and aspirations of the 
people” is the foundation of good governance and, likewise, serves as the foundation “for 
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the promotion of human rights”(UN Commission on Human Rights, Commission on 
Human Rights resolution 2000/64). Human rights deals extensively with power structures 
such as governmentality that center around inclusion and exclusion. Exclusion from 
power structures and a lack of inclusion and participation in the act of governing 
constitutes a direct threat to the realization of human rights. Human rights allow for 
accountability and call for participation by the people in order to meet the needs of the 
people. Human rights are, in this way, positioned to demand transparency, participation, 
and inclusion so as to fully realize the rights of individuals “to take part in the conduct of 
public affairs” (UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, Art 25). The study of governmentality, in its emphasis on power relations, often 
identities gaps that specifically pin point the existence of the very participation and 
exclusion of communities that human rights demand. Particularly with regards to 
governing over the environment, the state’s exclusion of indigenous or ethnic minority 
groups represents an unjust distribution of power that fails to provide indigenous peoples 
with control over  
“developments affecting them and their lands, territories 
and resources [that] will enable them to maintain and 
strengthen their institutions, cultures and traditions, and to 
promote their development in accordance with their 
aspirations and needs” (UN General Assembly, United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples).  
 
Through the practice of governmentality, states are able then to exclude 
indigenous knowledge claims. Indigenous traditional knowledge here refers to the 
“cumulative body of knowledge, know-how, practices and representations maintained 
and developed by peoples with extended histories of interaction with the natural 
environment (International Council for Science 2002, 10-11). This permits the state to 
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target certain communities, identifying them as guilty of environmental transgressions, 
thus allowing for “natures and natural resource-dependent communities [to be held] 
legible and accountable” (Goldman 2001, 508). This carried out, while simultaneously 
regulating “alternative knowledge” as illegitimate (Goldman 2001, 516-517). Such a 
practice becomes in fact a human rights violation as state’s fail to fulfill the obligations 
placed upon them, which outline “that respect for indigenous knowledge, cultures and 
traditional practices contributes to sustainable and equitable development and proper 
management of the environment” (UN General Assembly, United Nations Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples).  Disregarding that such communities “have best 
observed the environment [and] are thus best positioned to begin to frame sustainable 
solutions” (Chanza and De Wit 2016), the state rejects fully contributions stemming from 
the indigenous knowledge base.  This ultimately prevents these individuals from 
questioning the state’s application of governmentality and places increasing limitations 
upon the exercise of their free will with regards to the use of nature and natural resources 
that have been part of their livelihoods and cultural traditions for thousands of years. In 
doing so, the state sets in motion the means with which to destroy indigenous identity. 
With land and nature at the root of cultural identity, the severing of the access of 
indigenous communities to nature and natural resources brings about a loss of that very 
identity. Deeming such communities to not be capable of living off the land responsibly, 
the state promotes a sedentarization driven agenda that requires a forfeiture of one’s 
indigenous identity, in favor of a newly constructed identity crafted in the image of the 
idealized citizen of the state. This new citizen in turn, must accept the limitations 
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imposed upon their mobility, embrace an urban sedentary lifestyle, as well as, accept 
unconditionally the technical expertise of the government in managing the environment. 
 
4. The Human Rights Implications of Relocation and Rehousing  
 
  
 Following the implementation of the government’s relocation and rehousing 
programs, out of 1,062,436 households labeled as partly or completely pastoral—
spanning across the Tibet Autonomous Region, Qinghai, Sichuan, and Gansu—897,424 
households have been sedentarized as of 2012 (Tibetan Center For Human Rights and 
Democracy 2015, 15). The success of the government’s initial deployment of such 
policies has also resulted in an expansion of the resettlement policy to include non-
herders and has sought to rehouse or relocate the larger Tibetan rural population into New 
Socialist Villages (De Schutter 2012, 15). Between 2006 and 2011, an estimated two 
million people consisting of famers and herders were resettled into new housing or had 
their homes renovated as part of the Comfortable Housing Policy program (HRW 2013, 
4).  The process of relocation and rehousing has and continues to be marred with human 
rights violations, seen in the lack of transparency and forcible nature of the relocations, 
loss of traditional indigenous livelihoods resulting in the loss of culture, identity, and 
access to land, as well as the creation of cycles of dependency (Jeong 2015, Kernan 2013, 
and Norbu 2012). Relocation and rehousing is largely considered to be forcible, as a 
result, of a lack of viable alternatives to relocation and rehousing provided by the state 
and also due to the coercive measures employed by government officials to compel 
nomads to turn from their migratory lifestyles and their traditional habitats in order to 
adopt a sedentary lifestyle (HRW 2013). Chinese officials continue to rely on scientific 
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determinations by government experts rather than through consultation with ethnic 
communities in governing the grasslands, thus completely excluding nomads from the 
decision process surrounding relocate and rehousing. 
The sedentarization programs sponsored by the state also call into question the 
need for the protection of indigenous rights. While the Communist Party maintains that 
the country has no indigenous peoples, it chooses instead to refer to those native to 
certain regions within Chinese territories as national minorities. Although the United 
Nations has yet to adopt an official definition of the term indigenous, consensus does 
maintain that  
“Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those 
which, having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and 
pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, 
consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the 
societies now prevailing on those territories, or parts of 
them. They form at present non-dominant sectors of society 
and are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to 
future generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic 
identity, as the basis of their continued existence as 
peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, 
social institutions and legal system” (Martínez-Cobo 2004, 
2). 
 
Given such a definition, Tibetans as a whole and by extension, Tibetan nomads can be 
considered as an indigenous population. As such, under the international human rights 
system, they maintain “the right not to be subjected to forced assimilation or destruction 
of their culture” (United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People 2007, 
Article 8). Article 10 and 11 of the declaration goes on to guarantee indigenous peoples 
the right to  “free, prior and informed consent” and “just and fair compensation” with 
regards to removable off of their land, as well as provides indigenous peoples “the right 
to practice and revitalize their cultural traditions and customs.” The process of relocation 
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and rehousing which is surrounded by claims of a lack of transparency, consultation, and 
participation has, however, stripped Tibetans nomads of the right to property and security 
of land tenure, as well as resulted in the involuntary assimilation and cultural destruction 
of nomads within the region.  
Additional ramifications of the government’s relocation and rehousing agenda 
include the growing risk of plunging Tibetan households into accumulated debt, as 
nomads and other non-herders often find themselves forced to shoulder the financial 
burdens and costs of modernization. The Chinese government also requires that Tibetans 
“contribute about 60 percent of reconstruction costs” (HRW 2013, 89) and such 
stipulations place a heavy financial burden on the family unit that is already confronted 
with the immediate loss of traditional sources of revenue. Following the resettlement 
experience, critics have highlighted a correlation between the resulting loss of revenue 
and the loss of land, increases in the selling and slaughter of animals, and the loss of 
economic independence and increased food insecurity (De Schutter 2012, 15-16). The 
Communist Party itself has also admitted to these concerns, as its 2009 study conducted 
by the Reform Commission of the State Council found that village houses provided to 
Tibetan nomads lacked in design and in meeting the needs of the population, as well as 
negatively resulted in cutting pastoralists off from their herds (HRW 2013, 9).  This 
represents a failure on the part of the State to fulfill its responsibility to ensure the right to 
adequate housing. Turning to the implementation of the New Socialist Countryside 
Campaign, the execution of the campaign has been largely left to the care of local 
governments, yet the existing inequalities between local government financing 
capabilities has resulted in a “lack of state funds to cover vocational training classes” 
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(Ptackova 2012, 219). This coupled with existing inadequacies in government subsidies, 
needed to cover expenditures have resulted in the failure to bring about the successful 
integration of Tibetan nomads into a newly urban environment (Ptackova 2012, 219). 
Already forced to compete with Han Chinese migrants seeking new job opportunities in 
the region, Tibetan nomads lacking in professional skills training, education, and forced 
to overcome language and communication barriers find themselves disadvantaged within 
the job market. 
Relocation and rehousing in its current form has largely thrust the nomadic 
population rather unwillingly into a state constructed and unfamiliar urban environment, 
without the necessary tools and the capacity with which to succeed. Looking first, at the 
creation of New Socialist Villages, the government’s use of space and enclosure to create 
what can be characterized as rural cities represents a method of population control. The 
government itself in 2011 announced plans “to dispatch over 20,000 Party and 
government cadres to be stationed in Tibetan villages, to “live, eat and work” with the 
local population, ensure that stability is maintained, “conduct propaganda work,” and 
promote the objectives of the Comfortable Housing policy” (HRW 2013, 8). The creation 
of what, in essence, are political surveillance units within these New Socialist Villages 
highlight government motivations that extend beyond the proclaimed aims of the New 
Socialist Countryside Campaign and hint at a greater agenda of state control. Within such 
an agenda, the restrictions on the freedom of movement of Tibetan nomads are seen as 
integral to maintaining power and both eradicating separatist inclinations within the 
region, as well as securing the complete transformation of nomadic culture and identity. 
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5. Methodological Framework  
 
 Through the assessment of this lack of transparency and accountability, this paper 
will utilize the framework of green governmentality to assess the construction of the 
Chinese government’s creation of environmental truths or “knowledge claims” (Rogers et 
al. 2016). In doing so, this research will also document the process of subject forming 
that relegates Tibetan nomads into a population needing to be governed, while justifying 
and promoting the necessity of the Chinese government to take up the role of governor. 
The methodology employed throughout this paper is based on the methodological 
framework utilized by Rogers, Barnett, Webber, Finlayson, and Wang in their paper 
submitted to the Royal Geographical Society, “Governmentality and the conduct of 
water: China’s South-North Water Transfer Project” (2016).  Their research assesses 
China’s South–North Water Transfer (SNWT) project, as “a programme of government 
that attempts to render the distribution of water across space more governable and 
administrable”  (Rogers et al. 2016, 429). Utilizing the framework of Mitchel Dean, and 
his proposed four dimensions which consists of the forms of visibility, techne of 
government, episteme of government, and forms of identification (Dean 2010), with 
which to analyze governance, Rogers et al. look at China’s South-North Water Transfer 
(SNWT) project “as an attempt to steer forms of conduct and to render subjects and 
spaces governable and administrable” (Rogers et al. 2016, 430). This paper will utilize a 
similar approach to that of Rogers et al. in focusing on the analysis of “English and 
Chinese academic, media and government documents through a governmentality lens” 
(Rogers et al. 2016, 429).  
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 Table 1 listed below provides a list of sources that I have selected to analyze in 
order to assess the rhetoric of the state through a governmentality framework. The 
sources compiled represent official documents, reports, laws, statistics, and statements by 
government officials published and circulated by the People’s Republic of China. All 
sources selected have been translated into English by the government and disseminated to 
the nation’s citizens and to the international public. As the practice of the Chinese 
government is to publish information across multiple media venues, no real value is 
placed on the specific origin of the source selected, as the majority of sources analyzed 
can be found across multiple government news agency websites as well as through the 
online publications of various international embassies and diplomatic missions of the 
PRC (refer to Table 1). The decision to analyze specifically government documents and 
statements was made in order to limit claims of misinterpretation of the government’s 
policies and the motivations that drive these policies from possible invalid and biased 
assessments made by third parties. As such, the collection of these sources best highlight 
the use of green governmentality by the Chinese government through the interpretation of 
the Communist Party’s own declarations regarding Tibetan society, economy, and the 
environment; keeping in mind the limited availability of resources concerning issues 
related to Tibet made public by the government. The sources listed here have been 
selected in order to touch upon the beginning of the passing of the Grassland Law of the 
People’s Republic of China (2002), which served as a precursor to the start of the 
government’s relocation and rehousing programs in 2006 and continue on to document 
the government’s agenda within the current time frame. This was done, partly to depict 
that the coercive sedentarization of Tibetan nomads in the name of ecological 
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preservation is still an ongoing practice of the state, as well as to more effectively capture 
and trace how the government identifies who and what is to be governed over, the 
process with which the central government goes about governing, and the foundations it 
lays to sustain and justify its regime from year to year. 
 
Table 1: Source Compilation and Composition 
Source Alternative Sources 
Grassland Law of the People's 
Republic of China. 2002. National 
People’s Congress of the People’s 
Republic of China. December 28. 





-Published online on China Internet 
Information Center, a portal site authorized by 
the Chinese government, under the auspices of 





State Council. 2006. “Abstract of 
the Eleventh Five-Year Plan 
outline”. People’s Daily Online. 




-Published online via the PRC’s official web 





Embassy of the People's Republic 
of China in the United States of 
America. 2008. “Facts and Figures 
of Tibetan development”. March 





-Published online via China Daily, the 
government’s English-language newspaper on 





White Paper 2008. Protection and 
Development of Tibetan Culture. 
Permanent Mission of the People's 





-Published online via the website of the 
National People's Congress (NPC) on March 
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-Published online via the China Internet 






Wen, Jiabao. 2009. “Towards 
Greater Development and 
Opening-up of Western China”. 
Speech, Second Western China 
International Cooperation Forum, 
October 16. Ministry of Foreign 








White Paper 2009. Fifty Years of 
Democratic Reform in Tibet. 
Information Office of the State 
Council of the People's Republic 
of China. Permanent Mission of 
the People's Republic of China.  





-Published online via Xinhuanet, the official 





Xinhua. 2010. “Chinese President 
stresses "leapfrog development, 






-Published online via China Tibet Online, a 
website established by People’s Daily Online, 






Fifth Tibet Work Forum. 2015. 
Rao ai min. 2010. ‘Zhonggong 
Zhongyang Guowuyuan Zhaokai 
Di Wuci Xizang Gongzuo 
Zuotanhui.’ [‘The CPC Central 
Committee and the State Council 
held the Fifth Forum on Work in 
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Tibet.’] January 18-20. Renmin 





White Paper. 2015b. Successful 
Practice of Regional Ethnic 
Autonomy in Tibet. The State 
Council Information Office of the 








-Published online via China Daily, the 
government’s English-language newspaper on 
September 6, 2015.  
 




-Published online via Xinhuanet, the official 
news agency of the PRC on September 6, 2015. 
 




White Paper. 2015a. Tibet's Path 
of Development Is Driven by an 
Irresistible Historical Tide. The 
State Council Information Office 
of the People's Republic of China. 






-Published online via Xinhuanet, the official 





2016 China Statistical Yearbook: 
Figure 6-29 Per Capita Disposable 
Income of Rural Households by 
Region. Compiled by the National 









  Pierre, N. 
34  
6. An Analysis of Green Governmentality in China  
 
 Green governmentality in China has been implemented particularly within the 
western regions and within Tibet. It has manifested from the link that the Chinese 
government has created between  “environmental improvement and economic growth” 
(Yeh 2009, 884). The state in its application of green governmentality has created a 
discourse surrounding the backwardness of Tibetan nomads and the threat that they 
constitute to the environment. The government has highlighted ecological degradation 
with it attributes to overgrazing as a serious threat to both areas downstream which 
consist of “China's major population centres”, as well as to “national social development” 
(Yeh 2005, 24).  The response of the State to this perceived threat has been to identify 
itself as a technological expert, best equipped to govern and improve both nature and the 
people. Such improvements materialize into sedentarization policies that “constitute a 
dramatic re-making of the pastoral landscape” (Yeh 2005, 24) and which represent an 
exercise of state control over a once problematic migratory population. Further in depth 
analysis of green governmentality in the context of Chinese sedentarization driven 
policies that target the Tibetan nomadic population will be conducted through Dean’s 
framework of the four dimensions to analyze governmentality.  
 
6.1 Forms of Visibility: The 1st Dimension of Governmentality  
 
 Dean, in pinpointing the forms of visibility that exist as a dimension of 
governmentality focuses in on the action taken by state actors to “delimit objects to be 
governed” (Rogers et al. 2016, 431). This line of action is evident in the Communist 
Party’s introduction of the 11th Five Year Plan (2006-2010), which set out to designate 
  Pierre, N. 
35  
what objectives would later become the focal point of the government’s sphere of 
governance, as well as outline the problems and necessary set of solutions laid out by the 
State. The framing of an underdeveloped China existing in the shadow and at the 
detriment of Beijing and other developed regions of the country has provided the 
justification for the government’s development aims in the western regions and within 
Tibet.  Under the tagline of “promoting balanced regional development”, with the launch 
of the 11th Five Year Plan, the government  
“proposes to boost balanced regional development to 
gradually form development arrangement that has clear 
function positioning, virtuous interaction among the 
eastern, central and western regions, and narrows gap in 
public service and people's living standards” (The State 
Council 2006).  
 
Here the government’s five year plans refers to the “blueprint for China's economic and 
social development in the next five years”, which serves as the “common action 
guidelines for all ethnic groups in China as well as the important basis for the 
government to carry out economic regulation, market supervision, social administration 
and public service” (The State Council 2006).  The statements made by the Communist 
Party within the 11th Five Year Plan outlines specifically what Dean refers to as “how 
different locales and agents are to be connected with one another” (Dean 2010, 41) and 
how authority is designated. Having established the existence of a lagging and 
unproductive western region, holding back the larger society, the government further 
outlines the plan  
“to give overall planning to population distribution, 
economic deployment, land utilization and urbanization 
pattern in light of the carrying capacity of resources and 
environment, existing development density and potential, 
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so as to classify the land space into four categories: 
optimized development, key development, restricted and 
banned development zones” (The State Council 2006).  
 
This emphasis on “land utilization” renders the usage of space and of the environment 
that occurs outside of the government’s planning as problematic. It further places the 
government in an authoritative role that later allows for and justifies the governing of 
nature, particularly with regards to excluding nomads within that sphere of governance. 
This very act of making visible the nomadic population and problematizing the prior 
management of the environment, so as to provide justification and a sole designated set 
of solutions is similarly outlined in the 11th Five Year Plan through the creation of the 
New Socialist Countryside Campaign. The plan here, announced that  
“while actively promoting urbanization, solid and steady 
progress will be made in building a new socialist 
countryside according to the requirement of advanced 
production, improved livelihood, a civilized social 
atmosphere, clean and tidy villages and democratic 
administration” (State Council 2006). 
Directed largely towards the Western region and later implemented throughout Tibet, the 
New Socialist Countryside Campaign calls for a radical transformation of rural society.  
In the process, the campaign also designates certain standards that are to dictate 
modernity and urbanization. This pursuit of the creation of  “clean and tidy villages” 
when implemented amongst the nomadic population represents the government’s use of 
space and enclosure to create what can be characterized as rural cities which allows for 
more rigid population control. Following the introduction of such programs and policies, 
the Chinese government has continued to employ a reflective stance that only continues 
to sustain and add credibility to the regime’s governance. In an address at the Second 
Western China International Cooperation Forum, Premier Wen Jiaobo notes that  
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“Ten years ago, the Chinese government made a major 
strategic decision to implement the Western Development 
Strategy with a view to changing the backward outlook of 
western China, building a moderately prosperous society in 
all respects, improving national land development pattern, 
promoting balanced regional development, expanding the 
scope of opening-up both internally and externally, and 
fostering new economic growth areas. Over the past 10 
years, the Chinese government has been scaling up support 
for the western region through planning guidance, policy 
support, financial input, project development and human 
resources exchanges” (Wen 2009). 
 
With regards to forms of visibility, the government reiterates its perception of the 
regions and the peoples of the West as underdeveloped and backwards. In problematizing 
the West, the government is able to validate its own technical expertise and position itself 
as savior and protector of these territories. The state’s realm of expertise is rooted in the 
rhetoric of environmental degradation that is promoted, as well as through the self-
identifies effectiveness of the government’s unilateral environmental governance. 
Through attributing “the rapid economic development in Tibet” with “the strong support 
of the central government” (Wen 2009), the Communist Party legitimizes its role as a 
technical expert within the region. The emphasis on technical solutions to the protection 
and maintenance of nature that the government sets into place focuses solely on 
“advanced technologies, equipments and managerial expertise” (Wen 2009). This set of 
expertise deems Tibetan nomads to be the problem rather than part of the solution needed 
to combat grassland and other environmental degradation. As a result, ecological 
revitalization and preservation projects implemented in Western China and throughout 
the Tibetan region such as “returning farmland and grazing land to forest and grassland” 
make invisible nomadic ties to the land and rejects the inclusion and participation of 
nomads within environmental governance structures. Ultimately, the government relies 
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on the dissemination of data and figures that it puts out to continue to designate and 
legitimize who and what is to be governed. Through statistics, the government maintains 
that “the per capita net income of farmers and herdsmen maintained double-digit growth 
for five consecutive years” (Wen 2009) and that “the economy of Tibet has been growing 
at an annual rate of 12 percent or more over the past seven years” (Embassy of the PRC 
in the USA 2008). Government publications further state that  
“Tibet’s GDP soared from 327 million yuan in 1965 to 
92.08 billion yuan in 2014, a 281-fold increase. Since 1994, 
the local GDP has grown at an annual rate of 12.4 percent 
on average, registering double-digit growth for 20 
consecutive years. Local fiscal revenues increased from 
22.39 million yuan in 1965 to 16.475 billion yuan in 2014, 
an average annual increase of 14.46 percent, further 
enhancing Tibet’s self-development capabilities” (White 
Paper 2015b). 
 
In such a manner, the government continues to selectively stress the positive effects of 
urbanization to the Tibetan and Chinese society, constructing state approved guidelines 
dictating what it means to have succeeded. This narrative of success employed by the 
government, however, fails to account for the still existing wealth disparity that exists 
regional. Looking particularly at Tibet, the 2016 China Statistical Yearbook compiled by 
the National Bureau of Statics of China, in looking at the per capita disposable income of 
rural households by region marked the disposal income of Tibet to have increased in 
2013 from 6,553.4 yuan to 8,243.7 yuan in 2015 (2016 China Statistical Yearbook). This 
remains still lower than the national average disposal income recorded at 9,249.6 yuan in 
2013 and 11,421.7 yuan in 2015 and dwarfs in comparison to the recorded increase in 
disposable income from 17,101.2 yuan in 2013 to 20,568.7 yuan in 2015 seen in Beijing 
(2016 China Statistical Yearbook). The discrepancies in income that continue to persist in 
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Tibet are not readily underscored by the government, bringing forth once more, questions 
concerning the effectiveness and success of the government’s development driven 
policies to the Tibetan populace.  
Such discrepancies regarding gaps in achievement markers that designate 
development successes are further reiterated when concerning the Tibetan nomadic 
community. Following the introduction in 2006 of a program to construct houses for 
220,000 local farming and herding households by the year 2010, the government noted 
that “the per capita housing area for Tibetan herders has reached 36.4 square meters, 16.8 
square meters more than before the project” (Embassy of the People's Republic of China 
in the United States of America 2008). The government maintains this is in conjunction 
with the aims of protecting the environment, and directs attention to financial investments 
in the region, such as in noting that “during the 10th five-year plan (2001-2005), more 
than 120 million yuan was spent to protect wetlands and grasslands in Tibet” (Embassy 
of the People's Republic of China in the United States of America 2008). Such selective 
visibility characterizes Tibetans as not being a vulnerable population, marginalized by 
economic progress, but rather, positions the state as the source of advancement and 
development in the region. Through the introduction of new government initiatives that 
frame developing the west, building a new socialist countryside, and shifting nomads off 
of the grazing land as the solution to China’s problem of underdevelopment and 
environmental concerns, the government is able to shift blame to those identified as 
backwards. With development and stability tied in to environmental protection (Xinhua 
2010), the government successfully constructs and makes visible its agenda for Tibet. 
Within the framework of such an agenda, those, such as Tibetan nomads who become 
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burdened with the label of being underdeveloped and backwards find themselves 
identified as subjects to be governed and by extension find the land and environment as 
the objects demarcated by the State to be governed over.  
 
6. 2 Techne of Government: The 2nd Dimension of Governmentality 
 
In pinpointing the “mechanism, procedures, [and] technologies through which 
rule is accomplished” (Rogers et al. 2016, 431), it becomes perhaps best to look into the 
laws, programs, and plans that the Chinese government has put forward, which identify 
the importance of technology within their structures of governances. The reintroduction 
of the Grassland Law in 2002 “increased governmental power to limit herds and resettle 
people to 'protect, develop and make rational use of grasslands' ” (HRW 2013, 40) 
(Grassland Law of the People's Republic of China 2002, Art 18, 45, 48). Article 1 states 
that the  
“law is enacted with a view to protecting, developing and 
making rational use of grasslands, improving the ecological 
environment, maintaining the diversity of living things, 
modernizing animal husbandry and promoting the 
sustainable development of the economy and society” 
(Grassland Law of the People's Republic of China 2002).  
 
Article 3 goes on to clarify that  
“with regard to grasslands, the State applies the principles 
of scientific planning, all-round protection, giving priority 
to the development of key grasslands, and rational use, in 
order to promote the sustainable use of grasslands and the 
harmonious development of the ecology, economy and 
society” (Grassland Law of the People's Republic of China 
2002). 
Such clauses represent the technical means with which the government seeks to achieve 
its ends of ecological, economic, and societal development (Grassland Law of the 
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People's Republic of China 2002). Scientific planning, then, takes on the role of the 
techne of government. The promotion of “scientific research in protection, development, 
use and monitoring of grasslands” designates scientists and technicians (Grassland Law 
of the People's Republic of China 2002) as experts to the grassland, thus limiting who is 
deemed qualified or not to govern over nature. In the midst of such reasoning, Tibetan 
nomads are deemed unknowledgeable and incapable of rangeland management, ignoring 
the centuries of care that nomads have contributed to the land and to the environment. 
Dean in his work asserts “technical means are a condition of governing” (Dean 2010, 42) 
and it is solely the State who holds the power to task the administrative department under 
the State Council with supervising the grasslands (Grassland Law of the People's 
Republic of China 2002, Art. 42). The end goal of the government has been the 
transformation and development of the Western regions in the image of the more 
developed eastern and coastal regions. The realization of this image is dependent on the 
technical solutions that the State introduces. Such solutions however exclude nomadic 
contributions and devalue nomadic knowledge regarding environmental management.  
 
6. 3 Episteme of Government: The 3rd Dimension of Governmentality  
 
In analyzing governmentality, an analysis of the epistemene of government or the 
justifications given for governance is evident in the creation of the discourse of Tibet and 
Tibetan nomads as backwards and in need of constant oversight by the Community Party. 
In speaking of Tibet, the government has continued to frame the existence of two Tibet’s. 
State media speaks repeatedly of a Tibet of the past prior to being under Chinese rule and 
of a new Tibet flourishing under the guidance of the Communist Party. The government 
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often characterizes this old Tibet as being “a stagnant society on the edge of collapse” 
(White Paper 2009). It labels such a Tibet, without the assistance of the Chinese 
government as being  
“in a state of extreme isolation and backwardness, almost 
without a trace of modern industry, commerce, science and 
technology, education, culture or health care. Primitive 
farming methods were still being used, and herdsmen had 
to travel from place to place to find pasture for their 
livestock” (White Paper 2009). 
 
This becomes further justification for governance as this reinforces the state’s claims of 
Tibetans and Tibetan nomads as being incapable of successfully governing themselves 
and of course of governing over the environment. Focusing specifically on Tibetan 
nomads, the Communist Party maintains, “before the democratic reform in 1959, Tibetan 
peasants and herdsmen had barely any means of production”(White Paper 2009). Such 
characterizations work to give credibility to the necessity of intervention by the central 
government. It contributes to the formation of a knowledge system promoted by the 
central government that states, “modern science and technology in Tibet started from 
scratch”  (White Paper 2008). As such, the scientific advancements seen in the region are 
intended to be viewed as a direct result of the implementation of numerous “policies, 
laws and regulations,” as well as financial investments that promote and develop science 
and technology throughout the region (White Paper 2008).  
“Guided by the Scientific Outlook on Development, the 
central government lays great emphasis on environmental 
protection, deeming it as an important part of development. 
Aiming at the strategic objectives of building the ecological 
safety barrier as well as ecological and beautiful Tibet, the 
regional government strives to establish and follow a new 
sustainable pattern of development on the Tibet plateau. 
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Both the central and regional governments have adopted 
quite a number of strict measures for environmental 
protection. Projects have been carried out to protect natural 
forests, to reforest cultivated land, and to restore grassland 
by prohibiting grazing, as have grassland ecological 
environment improving programs like conservation and 
recovery of natural grassland, settlement of nomads, man-
made grassland, and deteriorated pastureland 
improvement.” (White Paper 2015a)  
 
The government transforms itself into the representatives of knowledge, 
prioritizing the “scientific outlook on development” within the framework of 
environmental governance, and connects this notion of governance with social stability, 
livelihood improvement, and economic development (Fifth Tibet Work Forum 2015). 
The notion then, of “environmentally sustainable development becomes a new 
technology of government” (Yeh 2005, 14). This allows for the designations and 
justifications of how best to care for the environment.  The protective measures that the 
government then introduces as solutions to grassland degradation allow for the exclusion 
of nomads who have been labeled as a threat to the grasslands.  Nomads existing within 
their traditional livelihoods and migrating across the grasslands with their herds 
essentially become classified as “problems of government” (Yeh 2005, 9). They 
constitute as a perceived threat and it is this perception of threat that “makes local herders 
visible and accountable for their purportedly degradation-inducing range practices” (Yeh 
2005, 24). Once visible, they are subject to a package of 'improvements' including 
resettlement” (Yeh 2005, 24). Having successfully delegitimized the capabilities of the 
Tibetan populace, the government consequently is left unchallenged in asserting that:  
“the will of the people of all ethnic groups in China, 
including the Tibetans, shall never be shaken from 
safeguarding national unity and sovereignty, from 
following the socialist road with Chinese characteristics 
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under the leadership of the Communist Party of China, 
from holding on to the system of regional autonomy, from 
promoting the realization of modernization in Tibet, and 
from building a new, united and democratic Tibet with a 
prosperous, civilized and harmonious society” (White 
Paper 2009).  
 
This results in the co-opting of the will of Tibetans and Tibetan nomads with the will of 
the Central government, allowing for the state to link as Emily Yeh has previously 
suggested, environmental governance with improving certain communities (Yeh 2005). 
Ultimately, this grants the central government “greater control over both the resources 
and the people who use them” (Yeh, 2005, 16). 
 
6. 4 Forms of Identification: The 4th Dimension of Governmentality   
 The Chinese government’s construction and framing of the nomadic identity 
within the larger Han Chinese majority society has long been rooted in this discourse of 
backwardness. The existence of this discourse has allowed for the government to step in 
as governors of a population depicted as being in desperate need of governance. The 
central government has continued to promote this image of the old Tibet as a “society of 
theocratic feudal serfdom (White Paper 2015a) consisting of “serfs and slaves” who 
“suffered destitution, cruel oppression and exploitation, and possessed no means of 
production or personal freedom whatsoever, not to mention other basic human rights” 
(White Paper 2009).  Such a Tibet is portrayed as “closed, backward and isolated from 
modern civilization” (White Paper 2015a), necessitating the need for the intervention of a 
benevolent governor. The Communist Party positions itself to be exactly that and 
maintains that  “following the launch of reform and opening up in 1978, the drive for 
modernization has brought extensive benefits to Tibet as much as to any other part of the 
  Pierre, N. 
45  
country” (White Paper 2015a). Continuing, the Party notes that: 
“through more than 60 years of development, the people of 
Tibet have found a path of development that is both 
characteristically Chinese and suited to the actual 
prevailing conditions in Tibet” (White Paper 2015, “Tibet's 
Path of Development Is Driven by an Irresistible Historical 
Tide”). 
 
In this way, the government constructs the identity of Tibetans as lacking in knowledge 
of self-development. Ultimately, this works to exclude the Tibetan population from the 
discourse surrounding development. This then allows for the Chinese government to 
assert that in this case, only the Communist Party knows best and it is only through the 
implementation of administrative practices and knowledge claims promoted by the 
central government that the peoples of Tibet can be bettered. Supported and financed by 
the government, the CCP’s political agenda maintains that in Tibet, “the drive for 
modernization continues” (White Paper 2015a). No room is left to question what this 
modernization looks like, whom it threatens to leave behind, and more importantly, 
whether it includes Tibetans and Tibetan nomads as the recipients of its benefits.  
The framing of Tibet - China relations as “a single family sharing a common 
destiny” pursing “the [so called] Chinese Dream of the great renewal of the nation” 
(White Paper 2015a), represents a rejection of an individual Tibetan identity, choosing 
instead to completely disregard a rich and separate cultural history distinct from that of 
the larger Han Chinese majority. Former President Hu Jintao further expanded upon this 
in 2010, stressing, “awareness of being part of the Chinese nation and being law-abiding 
citizens must be constantly enhanced among cadre and the masses in Tibet” (Xinhua 
2010). Characterized best as the Communist Party’s construction of representation, we 
witness the relegating of Tibetans and by extension of Tibetan nomads to the role of 
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subjects.  As subjects, according to the government, they have proven their incapability to 
develop when left alone. In 2009, with the marking of the 50th Anniversary of the 
Democratic Reform in Tibet, the government stressed once more that  
“it is conducive to telling the right from wrong in history 
and helps the world better understand a real Tibet in 
progress for us to review the overwhelming democratic 
reform and the profound historical changes that have taken 
place in Tibet over the past 50 years, to shed light on the 
laws governing the social development of Tibet” (White 
Paper 2009).  
 
Reiterating this occurrence of the truths that regime construct in order to govern, it 
becomes possible to witness again the designation of the government as the holder of 
“truth”, once more legitimizing the rule of the central government, while simultaneously 




Governmentality dictates that the ends of government lie in the population. To the 
Chinese government, continued economic growth and development in the western 
regions is dependent on controlling the Tibetan population and in particular, in 
controlling the nomadic population. Within the system of green governmentality 
practiced by the PRC, Tibetan nomads become both the means and the ends of the state’s 
larger development agenda. Contrary to the desired ends of the Communist Party, Tibetan 
nomads have long presented an obstacle to Beijing’s urbanization driven agenda. The 
migratory nature of nomads has thwarted effective supervision over the population and 
their rejection of the market-economy has, in the eyes of the state, been characterized as a 
failure to contribute to the Communist Party’s advancement. Yet the development of the 
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west and the increased exploitation of Tibet’s resources are dependent on governing 
nature, the very nature that within the limits of the Tibetan Plateau had previously been 
under the domain of nomads. The Chinese government has worked however to 
successfully counteract this by promoting the discourse of a dire earth and of an increased 
threat to the Tibetan Plateau and to all Chinese citizens. In framing nomads as the main 
perpetrators of environmental degradation, the government has been able to successfully 
gain control over the environment and of the land, as well as successfully sedentarize a 
large majority of the nomadic population.  
In this way, state control within the region is seen as dependent upon sedentarization 
and the larger objective of sedentarization is to be to bring forth the realization of the 
idealized Chinese citizen. Tibetan nomads within Chinese society have and continue to 
exist as the Other and as a vestige of the past. Their pastoral livelihood amplified through 
such a lens thus represents something that is inherently at odds with that of the Han 
Chinese citizen committed to urbanization and economic prosperity. To the state, it is 
precisely such a citizen that is regarded as useful to the advancement the nation. In a 
governing framework where unity and conformity is the key to power, the existence of 
the Tibetan nomad connected to the very land, rich in natural resources that will aid in the 
continued development of the nation is a direct threat. Accordingly, the Chinese 
government has responded to this threat through the guise of ecological protection efforts 
that call for relocation and rehousing, which leads towards a complete shift off of the 
land. With land inherently at the root of the identity of Tibetan nomads, the eradication of 
nomadic land tenure highlights the expectations of governmentality in the Chinese 
context. The demands of governmentality come to require of the Tibetan nomadic 
  Pierre, N. 
48  
population greater complacency and assimilation into the larger society. Such demands 
however, are set up to come at the loss of culture, identity, and nomadic knowledge. 
Redefining the spatial distribution of the grassland pushes Tibetan nomads towards urban 
settlements and inevitably accounts for a loss of nomadic identity, as we begin to factor 
in the prolonged implications to future generations, looking particularly at indigenous 
culture and pastoral knowledge.  The failure of the Chinese government to take into 
account nomadic knowledge regarding the management of nature brings to question the 
truthfulness of the proposed aim of the Communist Party to combat ecological 
degradation and effectively manage the Tibetan ecosystem.  
 As of 2009, there have been a reported 146 instances of self-immolation 
(International Campaign for Tibet 2016b). Of these individuals, many have originated 
from nomadic communities in Tibet and have employed the practice as form of protest 
against attacks on their culture and identity by the government (International Campaign 
for Tibet 2016b). Following the outbreaks of such protests, the government has 
responded with arrests, crackdowns, and with the increased presence of security forces, 
all of which further threatens cultural expression and Tibetan ethnic identity 
(International Campaign for Tibet 2016b). The lost lives of these individuals’ comes to 
represent how through the Chinese government’s exercise of governmentality, most at 
stake ultimately remains the very root of nomadic identity. With nomadic identity 
inexplicably linked to the land, the government's sedentarization programs bring about a 
destruction of identity. The precise act of sedentarization is marred in loss with the 
realization that to be sedentary is to no longer be nomadic. The government’s relocation 
and rehousing programs come to represent a discarding of what is regarded as the old and 
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backwards, in favor of what has been legitimized as the new and correct urban lifestyle. 
This is due to the promotion of environmental truths that pave the way for scientific 
approaches to environmental management. The reconceptualization of the other into the 
status quo destroys the existence of an alternative lifestyle that has been outside of the 
government's sphere of governance. The existence of the nomadic lifestyle has long 
presented a threat to the governance structure of the PRC, which seeks to affirm itself as 
having sole legitimacy of rule. The continued immobilization of Tibetans as whole and a 
reshaping of the traditional landscape of Tibetan settlements and society represents a state 
directed process of destruction intended to fracture a unified identity that is inherently 
separate from that of the established Han Chinese majority identity. What ultimately 
remains is a state-constructed identity that Tibetan nomads struggle to familiarize 
themselves with. Yet, not provided by the central government with the necessary services 
needed to facilitate their successful integration into urban society, nomads are left with 
only the path leading toward increased dependency upon the State. Ultimately, this once 
more works to legitimize the government’s knowledge claims and exercise of 
governmentality within the region, thus creating a cycle that ultimately concludes with 
the nomad giving way to the state. And with the state never quite satisfied with the limits 
of its power, it will continue to move on, seeking the next object of its governmentality. 
In its wake, unless prevented from being so, will remain merely remnants of stories 
passed down amongst generations, of the rich cultural traditions and ecological 
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